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 I borrow this phrase from Velleman 2000. Other writers, for instance Walker (2001 ) , talk about “truth 
aimedness” 
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2
 For a defense of this view as an interpretation of the aiming at truth feature and against belief-voluntarism, 
see Bennett 1990 
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3
 It’s a disputed question what the exact form for expressing normative properties is. See in particular 
Broome (2000). I adopt here the framework of what I call normative conditionals in Engel 2002. On these 
issues, see also Zangwill 1998 and  Wedgwood 2002 
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4
  It is important to specify that it is a norm for belief, since it should not imply that truth is in itself a norm. I 
investigate this issue in Engel 2000 and Engel 2002, ch. 5.  
5
  In Sartre’s novel La nausée, the character named « The autodidact » spends his time at the town library, 
reading every single book there from A to Z in the catalogue.  
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6
 Jackson 2000: 101  notes that the normative constraint clashes with Stalnaker’s account of belief in terms 
of possible worlds: subjects who believe that P and that if P then Q, but would do not believe Q will be 
subjects who do not not have a single system of beliefs.  
7
 See Winters 1979, Engel 1999 for further discussion 
8
 I shall come back below on this. 
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 Here I am much indebted to Owens 2001  
10
  There is a large literature on the difference between belief and acceptance.  It is review in part in Engel 
(2000)  
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11
 See e.g. Bernard Williams 1978, Peirce 18  
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 I am indebted here to the discussion in Owens 2000 and 2001  
13
 See Owens 2000, 108-109. 
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  I therefore agree with Wedgwood (2001) that the normative sense (NT) is the correct specification of the 
aim of belief. But I disagree with him that this norm is more basic than the norm of knowledge (2001: 289-
90) 
15
 The objection is well formulated by David 2001: “Although knowledge is certainly no less desirable than 
true belief, the knowledge-goal is at a disadvantage here because it does not fit into this picture in any 
helpful manner.  Invoking the knowledge-goal would insert the concept of knowledge right into the 
specification of the goal, which would then no longer provide an independent anchor for understanding 
epistemic concepts.  In particular, any attempt to understand justification relative to the knowledge-goal 
would invert the explanatory direction and would make the whole approach circular and entirely 
unilluminating.  After all, knowledge was supposed to be explained in terms of justification and not the other 
way round.  This does not mean that it is wrong in general to talk of knowledge as a goal, nor does it mean 
that epistemologists do not desire to have knowledge.  However, it does mean that it is bad epistemology to 
invoke the knowledge-goal as part of the theory of knowledge because it is quite useless for theoretical 































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                            
purposes: The knowledge-goal has no theoretical role to play within the theory of knowledge.” (David 2001: 
154)  
16
  Actually some writers, most notably Crispin Sartwell (1992), do not take it to be absurd; on the contary 
they claim that knowledge is mere true belief on the basis is this argument. For a discussion of Sartwell’s 
argument, see Ollson 2003. Sartwell’s argument is the product of both maintaining that truth is the aim of 
inquiry and that knowledge is the aim: given that they have the same aims, it follows that they are the same 
thing ! One philosopher’s modus tollens is another philosopher’s modus ponens.  Olsson shows that there is 
a reductio of the proposed thesis that knowledge is merely  true belief, but that this reductio is not so easy to 
formulate. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                
*
 Earlier versions of this paper have been read at the University of Konstanz in January 2003, and at the University of 
Rome Tor Vergata at a conference on knowledge and cognition in May 2003. I thank  for their comments and 
encouragements Arthur Merin, Wolfgang Spohn, Gereon Wolters, Erik Olsson and Simone Gozzano.  
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